Introduction to Quantum Metamechanics (QMM) [excerpt]

Langan, C. M. (2019) Introduction to Quantum Metamechanics (QMM). Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 265-300

Introduction to Quantum Metamechanics (QMM) [paperback edition]

To John Archibald Wheeler and Martin Gardner, who encouraged me when others did not.

Abstract

Solutions for problems arising at the limits of science and philosophy require ontological grounding. Quantum Mechanics (QM) is increasingly called upon as a source of insight regarding such problems, but is not itself well-understood. The fact that QM has many conflicting interpretations for which ontological status is claimed demands a “post-quantum” theory which clarifies its meaning, settles the differences among its interpretations, and facilitates the analysis and solution of otherwise intractable problems. Herein described as Quantum Metamechanics (QMM), this theory is a “meta-interpretative” mapping of QM and its various interpretations into a supertautological description of reality, the CTMU Metaformal System. By incorporating the CTMU, a true ontic identity supporting the self-identification and self-existence of reality, QMM provides QM with a valid ontology in terms of which its various interpretations can be evaluated and synergized.

Keywords

Cognitive-Theoretic Model of the Universe; Quantum Mechanics; Quantum Metamechanics; QM; QMM; Ontology; Quantum Ontology; Metaformalization; Formal Quantization; Metacausation; Retrocausation; Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics

Introduction

As never before, scientists and philosophers are trying to solve “big questions” having to do with such imponderable concerns as the nature and extent of reality, the origin and nature of life, the nature of mind and consciousness, the origin of the cosmos, the nature of space, time, and causality, the essence of human existence and spirituality, so-called paranormal phenomena, and other matters seemingly resistant to mechanical, material, or physical explanation. Accordingly, science and philosophy have been gravitating toward the broad and highly successful theory of quantum mechanics (QM) as a source of insight. But despite its great theoretical and methodological utility, QM is as much a mystery as the questions themselves, and that of which the meaning is unclear is not itself a credible source of meaning. This has led to the search for a “post-QM” theory that properly explains QM itself and is thus better equipped to deal with metaphysical issues.

The purpose at hand is to identify the requirements of such a post-QM theory and then describe it in logical terms. Because this theory is necessarily a metatheory (or theoretical metalanguage) of QM, it is called Quantum Metamechanics or QMM.

Its purpose is to map QM, along with any valid hypothetical correlates designed to obviate or accommodate its apparently problematical features, into the CTMU Metaformal System (Langan, 2018), a comprehensive high-level formulation of the structure of reality independent of QM itself, and then to explicate their relationship and thereby synergistically relate the microscopic and macroscopic scales of reality to each other. Because the Metaformal System is a supertautological (intrinsically valid) reflexive model of reality predicated on its manifest intelligibility, QMM can be described as a reflexive application of model theory which reliably locates QM within the theater of being.

Opinions to the contrary notwithstanding, QM itself is not an ontology. QM is a formal system standing apart from its universe, a mathematical apparatus incorporating such ingredients as linear algebra, Fourier analysis, and probability theory. Given the existence of certain measurements, QM merely yields statistical predictions of their outcomes. QM does not include definitions or attributions of being, existence, or reality. Assertions relating these concepts to QM reside elsewhere, usually in a more or less speculative interpretation of QM in an imperfect description of an incomplete set of observations labeled “physical reality”.

That ontological status has nevertheless been claimed for various interpretations of QM – that they are called “quantum ontologies” – reflects a widespread misunderstanding of the word “ontology”. In the minds of most scientists and philosophers, ontology consists of “claims about existence”, e.g., the kinds of object, relation, operation, and process that exist in the world, and related epistemological claims about the nature and limits of knowledge, e.g., what kinds of knowledge are possible under what conditions. But insofar as anyone can make any claim at all about anything one likes, this is a trivialization. If existence can be meaningfully attributed to anything at all, then a valid ontological language must exist, and it must consist of actual knowledge rather than mere “claims”.

Concisely, an ontology is a theoretical language that accounts for the nature and content of being (reality, existence) and logically supports its attribution on all scales and all levels of discourse. This carries certain requirements that QM cannot fulfill. Being is not an ordinary attribute, but the highest attribute of all; no lesser attribute can be meaningfully attributed to anything of which some kind or level of being, even if “purely conceptual”, is not already a property. Moreover, just as QM suggests, ontology is intimately related to epistemology, which deals with the nature and limits of knowledge. Because something must exist in order to be known or identified, while that which exists must be identifiable as a value or instance of the attribute “existence”, identifiability and existence must coincide.

While QM is considered by some to define the limits of physical measurement and thus of empirical identification, there are other things to be identified in the name of science – ideas, concepts, sensations, feelings, judgments, intentions, intuitions, and theories like QM itself, for example. It is simply not the case that abstract and subjective forms of existence and identity can be wholly supervened on “physical” objects and processes.