The Reality Self-Simulation Principle: Reality is a Self-Simulation (excerpt)

Langan, C. M. (2020) The Reality Self-Simulation Principle: Reality is a Self-Simulation. Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, Vol. 16, № 1, pp. 466-486.

The Reality Self-Simulation Principle: Reality is a Self-Simulation (paperback edition)

Behind it all is surely an idea so simple, so beautiful, that when we grasp it – in a decade, a century, or a millennium – we will all say to each other, how could it have been otherwise.

– JOHN ARCHIBALD WHEELER, 1986

Abstract

The Simulation Hypothesis is the widely discussed conjecture that we inhabit a directly experienced but nevertheless artificial reality which, while supporting human consciousness and perception, is produced and displayed by a host system occupying a higher-level reality unseen from below. Reality is thus implicitly defined to have at least two levels, the one in which we seem to exist, and another associated with the host system. As the term “reality” is undefined beyond this hypothetical relationship, the Simulation Hypothesis is indifferent to the details, e.g., where the host system is located, how the host system works, who or what created and/or controls the host system, and in what respects the simulation resembles the higher reality containing it. But in any case, there must be an ultimate all-inclusive reality or “ontic ground state” that contains and supports whatever reality-simulations may exist, and it is natural to ask whether some aspects of the simulation concept may apply to it. The Reality Self-Simulation Principle states that ultimate reality is itself a natural reflexive self-simulation in which all intelligible levels of reality must exist whether simulated or not. Where ultimate reality is a global self-identification operator configured as the CTMU Metaformal System (Langan, 2018), i.e., the identity-language of intelligible reality, the Reality Self-Simulation (RSS) can be identified with the Cognitive-Theoretic Model of the Universe (CTMU; Langan, 2002), which thus describes reality as a self-simulating identity operator R* : R_INT | R_EXT and details its structure and dynamics, showing that it possesses its own universal form of consciousness (coherent self-identification and self-modeling capacity), an unbreakable quantum ontology, and a new paradigm for self-organization and emergence.

Keywords

Simulation, Self-Simulation, Self-Simulation Theory, Self-Simulation Principle, Self-Simulation Hypothesis, Reality Self-Simulation, Cognitive-Theoretic Model of the Universe, CTMU, Metaformal System

Introduction

In science and technology as well as popular culture, simulation is ubiquitous. A wide variety of processes are now being computationally simulated for purposes ranging from entertainment and scientific exploration to urban planning, drug design, and military and commercial flight training. These days, many apparently sane people are even looking about them with suspicion and wondering whether reality itself could be a simulation in which they have somehow been trapped, and if so, whether there is any possibility of escape.

By definition, a simulation is a model or imitation of an actual situation or process that fools an observer into thinking it is real given limited suspension of judgment. That is, it is similar enough to the original system or process to be “realistic” even while differing from it in some respects, preferably not so many as to destroy the illusion. But where the simulation concept is taken to the global limit – where we are considering the simulation of reality at large – illusion takes on a whole new meaning, converging on fundamental sensory and epistemological limitations.

Where it is the entire universe that is simulated, strange complexities and unexpected simplifications may arise. For example, although the simulation must differ from true reality in order to maintain its definitive artificiality, it is ideally indistinguishable from genuine reality for its inhabitants. In this sense, “artificially simulated reality” is an oxymoron; a “realistic” (convincing) artificially simulated reality must be real enough to make its resident observers regard it as genuine after all. Yet insofar as any simulated reality is embedded in all higher levels of reality, it may still be possible to discern ultimate reality within it.

The Simulation Hypothesis

The “Simulation Hypothesis” or “simulation theory” is a relatively new hypothesis with ancient roots, a modernization of the old idea that the physical world is merely a perceptual representation of a deeper level of reality. It posits that we inhabit an artificial system, e.g., a simulation programmed and running on a computer or other advanced digital construct possibly overseen by a higher intelligence (God, the devil, aliens, post-humans, etc.). Some variants involve consideration of how and when the technological capacity for reality-simulation evolves or emerges from base-level reality, and the assignment of likelihoods to the associated possibilities.

In the Western philosophical tradition, the simulation hypothesis can be traced back through the “evil demon” of Rene Descartes (Descartes, R., 1996), which he described as presenting “a complete illusion of an external world … devised to ensnare my judgement”, to Plato's Allegory of the Cave (Plato, n.d.) and beyond. In the Eastern tradition, it is foreshadowed in certain strains of Vedic and Buddhist philosophy and literature. But perhaps the first technical application of the modern version of the Simulation Hypothesis to an outstanding philosophical problem appeared in the paper “The Resolution of Newcomb's Paradox” (Langan, 1989), which features a reality-simulator capable of simulating the deterministic and nondeterministic aspects of real processes, including volition and cognition, in an otherwise paradoxical decision-theoretic scenario.

In addition to the Simulation Hypothesis, there exists a related trilemma with which it might sometimes be confused. This trilemma, called the “Simulation Argument”, is expressed as follows (Bostrom, 2003):

At least one of the following propositions is true: (1) The human species is very likely to go extinct before reaching a “posthuman” stage; (2) Any posthuman civilization is extremely unlikely to run a significant number of simulations of their evolutionary history (or variations thereof); and (3) We are almost certainly living in a computer simulation.

Whereas the Simulation Hypothesis forthrightly asserts that we live in an artificially simulated reality (subject to proof), the Simulation Argument is about the likelihood of living in an artificially simulated reality under specific evolutionary circumstances involving implicit technical assumptions. According to Bostrom (2008), “one can accept the simulation argument and reject the simulation hypothesis”. Thus, the Hypothesis and the Argument should not be confused.

However, the Hypothesis and the Argument share something in common: both are about artificial reality-simulations, and are thus distinguished from the true (artificially unsimulated) or ultimate reality in which they are implicitly assumed to exist. This raises a pair of questions. One question is ontological, having to do with the relationship between true reality and artificially simulated pseudo-reality, while the other question is epistemological, having to do with the possibility and means of distinguishing one from the other:

1. How do true reality and artificial simulation differ, and what if anything do they have in common?

2. Can the inhabitants of an artificial simulation distinguish it from true reality and vice versa (i.e., can real physically-embodied human beings distinguish the true reality they inhabit from an artificial one)?

To answer one or both of these questions, it seems that we require a sound definition of “true reality”, which to some extent entails a verifiable theory of reality. This “reality theory” must contain the required distinctions and a reliable means of applying them.